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Abstract
We present the first formal verification of a networked server
implemented in C. Interaction trees, a general structure for
representing reactive computations, are used to tie together
disparate verification and testing tools (Coq, VST, and Quick-
Chick) and to axiomatize the behavior of the operating sys-
tem on which the server runs (CertiKOS). The main theorem
connects a specification of acceptable server behaviors, writ-
ten in a straightforward “one client at a time” style, with
the CompCert semantics of the C program. The variability
introduced by low-level buffering of messages and interleav-
ing of multiple TCP connections is captured using network
refinement, a variant of observational refinement.
CCS Concepts • Software and its engineering→ Soft-
ware verification; Formal software verification;
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1 Introduction
The Science of Deep Specification [Appel et al. 2017] is an
ambitious experiment in specification, rigorous testing, and
formal verification “from internet RFCs down to transistors”
of real-world systems such as web servers. The principal
challenges lie in integrating disparate specification styles,
legacy specifications, and testing and verification tools to
build and reason about complex, multi-layered systems.
We report here on a first step toward realizing this vision:
an in-depth case study demonstrating how to specify, test,
and verify a simple networked server with the same fun-
damental interaction model as more sophisticated ones—it
communicates with multiple clients via ordered, reliable TCP
connections. Our server is implemented in C and verified,
using the Verified Software Toolchain [Appel 2014], against
a formal “implementation model” written in Coq [2018]; this
is further verified (in Coq) against a linear “one client at
a time” specification of allowed behaviors. The main prop-
erty we prove is that any trace that can be observed by a
collection of concurrent clients interacting with the server
over the network can be rearranged into a trace allowed by
the linear specification. We also show how property-based
random testing using Coq’s QuickChick plugin [Lampropou-
los and Pierce 2018] can be deployed in this setting, both
for detecting disagreements between the implementation
and specification and for validating the specification itself
against legacy servers. We compile the server code with
the CompCert verified compiler [Leroy 2009] and run it on
CertiKOS [Gu et al. 2016], a verified operating system with
support for TCP socket operations.
Our verified server provides a simple “swap” interface
that allows clients to send a new bytestring to the server and
receive the currently stored one in exchange. It is simpler in
many respects than a full-blown web server; in particular,
it follows a much simpler protocol (no authentication, en-
cryption, header parsing, etc.), which means that it can be
implemented with much less code.
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Moreover, the degree of vertical integration falls short
of our ultimate ambitions for the DeepSpec project, since
we stop at the CertiKOS interface (which we axiomatize)
instead of going all the way down to transistors. On the
other hand, the C implementation of our server is realistic
enough that it offers a challenging test of how to integrate
disparate Coq-based methodologies and tools for verifying
and testing systems software. In particular, it uses a single-
process, event-driven architecture [Pai et al. 1999], hides
latency by buffering interleaved TCP communications from
multiple clients, and is built on the POSIX socket API.
Contributions We describe our experiences integrating
Coq, CompCert, VST, CertiKOS, and QuickChick to build a
verified swap server. This is the first VST verification of a
program that interacts with the external environment. It is
also, to the best of our knowledge, the first verification of
functional correctness of a networked server implemented
in C. Our technical contributions are as follows:
First, we identify interaction trees (ITrees)—a Coq adapta-
tion of structures known variously as “freer” [Kiselyov and
Ishii 2015], “general” [McBride 2015], or “program” [Letan
et al. 2018] monads—as a suitable unifying structure for ex-
pressing and relating specifications at different levels of ab-
straction (Section 3).
Second, we adapt standard notions of linearizability and
observational refinement from the literature on concurrent
data structures to give a simple specificationmethodology for
networked servers that is suitable both for rigorous property-
based testing and for formal verification. We call this variant
network refinement (Section 4).
Third, we demonstrate practical techniques for both veri-
fying (Section 5) and testing (Section 6) network refinement
between a low-level implementation model and a simple
linear specification. We also demonstrate testing against the
compiled C implementation across a network interface.
Lastly, the ITrees embedded into both VST’s separation
logic and CertiKOS’s socket model allow us to make progress
on connecting the two developments. Though we leave com-
pleting the formal proofs as future work, we identify the
challenges and describe preliminary results in Section 7.
Section 2 summarizes the whole development. Sections 8
and 9 discuss related and future work.
2 Overview
Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of the entire case
study. This section surveys the major components, starting
with the high-level, user-facing specification (the linear spec-
ification shown at the top of the figure) and working down
to OS-level details.
Specifying the Swap Server Informally, the intended be-
havior of the swap server is straightforward: any number of
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Figure 1. Overview. The blue parts of the figure represent
components written in C, the red parts specifications in Coq.
The swap server implementation runs on top of CertiKOS; it
is proved to refine the implementation model with respect to
a VST axiomatization of the socket interface; the axioms in
VST, in turn, are validated by a lower-level axiomatization
in the style of CertiKOS, which is manually compared to
the (unverified) TCP implementation. The implementation
model “network refines” the linear specification. The fact
that the C implementation network refines the linear specifi-
cation is independently validated by property-based random
testing. In all the Coq models and specifications, interaction
trees model the observable behaviors of computations. The
dotted parts of the figure are either informal or incomplete.
Server Client 1 Client 2
connect
connect
‘abc’
‘000’
‘def’
‘abc’
Server Client 1 Client 2
connect
connect
‘ab’
‘d’‘c’
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‘0’
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‘abc’
Figure 2. Swap server examples. On the left is a simple run
that directly illustrates the linear specification. Each client
in turn establishes a connection, sends a three-byte message,
and receives the message most recently stored on the server
as a response. (‘000’ is the server’s initial state.) On the right
is another run illustrating internal buffering by the swap
server and reordering by the network. The network socket
may send one message in multiple chunks, messages from
different clients may be received in any order, and messages
may be delayed indefinitely (dotted arrow). The “explanation”
of the two runs in terms of the linear specification is the same.
clients can connect and send “swap requests,” each contain-
ing a fixed-size message. The server acts as a one-element
concurrent buffer: it retains the most recent message that it
has received and, upon getting a swap request, updates its
state with the new message and replies to the sender with
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CoFixpoint linear_spec ' (conns : list connection_id)
(last_msg : bytes) : itree specE unit :=
or ( (* Accept a new connection. *)
c ← obs_connect ;;
linear_spec ' (c :: conns) last_msg )
( (* Exchange a pair of messages on a connection. *)
c ← choose conns;;
msg ← obs_msg_to_server c;;
obs_msg_from_server c last_msg ;;
linear_spec ' conns msg ).
Definition linear_spec := linear_spec ' [] zeros.
Figure 3. Linear specification of the swap server. In the
linear_spec' loop, the parameter conns maintains the list
of open connections, while last_msg holds the message re-
ceived from the last client (which will be sent back to the
next client). The server repeatedly chooses between accept-
ing a new connection or doing a receive and then a send on
some existing connection picked in the list conns. The linear
specification is initialized with an empty set of connections
and a message filled with zeros.
the old one. The left-hand side of Figure 2 shows a simple
example of correct behavior of a swap server.
Figure 3 shows the linear specification of the server’s
behavior. It says that the server can either accept a con-
nection with a new client (obs_connect) or else receive a
message from a client over some established connection
(obs_msg_to_server c), send back the current stored message
(obs_msg_from_server c last_msg), and then start over with
the last received message as the current state. The set of
possible behaviors is represented as an interaction tree (of
type itree specE unit). We will discuss the types used here
in more details in Section 3.
Our main correctness theorem should relate the actual be-
havior of our server (the CompCert semantics of the C code)
to this linear description of its desired behavior. Informally:
Theorem 1. Any sequence of interactions with the swap
server that can be observed by clients over the network could
have been produced by the linear specification.
This theorem constrains the implementation to act as a
swap server: it prevents the server from sending a message
before it receives one, or while it has only received a partial
message; it prevents the server from sending an arbitrary
value in response to a request, or replying multiple times
with the same value that has only been received once; it also
prevents the server from sending a response to a client from
which it has not received a request. However, the “over the
network” clause is a significant caveat: the server communi-
cates with clients via TCP, and even a correct implementa-
tion might thus exhibit a number of undesirable behaviors
from the clients’ point of view. The network might drop all
packets after a certain point, causing the server to appear
to have stopped running, so the theorem allows the server
to stop running at any point. Similarly, the network might
Theorem swap_server_correct :
∃ impl_model , ext_behavior C_prog impl_model ∧
network_refines linear_spec impl_model.
Figure 4. End-to-end swap server correctness theorem.
delay messages and might reorder messages on different con-
nections, so the theorem allows the server to respond to an
earlier request after responding to a later request. However,
as long as the server performs any network operations, those
operations must be consistent with the protocol for a swap
server. The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows another run of
the system illustrating these possibilities; it should also be
accepted by the top-level theorem.
Figure 4 shows the formal specification linking the lin-
ear specification (linear_spec), which describes interactions
with one client at a time, to the C program (C_prog). It is split
in two parts articulated around an implementation model
(impl_model). It is another interaction tree that describes the
network-level behavior of the C program more closely than
the linear specification. Like the C program, the implemen-
tation model interleaves requests from multiple clients and
accounts for the effects of the network. A refinement between
the C program and the implementation model is formalized
by the VST property ext_behavior. Then the implementa-
tion model is connected to the specification by a different
network refinement layer (network_refines).
Network refinement The linear specification is short and
easy to understand, but an implementation that strictly fol-
lowed it would be obliged to serve clients sequentially, which
is not what real servers (including ours) want to do. More-
over, as shown on the right-hand side of Figure 2, the network
may delay and reorder messages, so that, for example, the
first two bytes of a message from client 1 might be received
after the first byte of a message from client 2. The server
should be able to account for this by buffering messages until
they are complete. The second part of our server specifica-
tion loosens the linear specification to account for the effects
of communicating over a network; this also permits realistic
implementations that serve multiple clients concurrently.
Network refinement states that every possible behavior of
the implementation model is allowed by the linear specifica-
tion, while accounting for message reordering and buffering
that might be introduced by the network and/or server. Sec-
tion 4 explains this process in more detail.
C Implementation Our C implementation is a simple but
reasonably performant server in a classical single-process,
event-driven style [Pai et al. 1999]. The implementationmain-
tains a list of connection structures, each representing a
state machine for one connection. Specifically, a connec-
tion structure contains (1) a state, which may be RECVING,
SENDING, or DELETED; (2) a buffer for storing bytes that have
been received on the connection; and (3) a buffer for storing
bytes to send on the connection.
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while (1 == 1) {
...
int num_ready =
select(maxsock + 1, &rs, &ws, &es, &timeout);
if (num_ready <= 0) { continue; }
int socket_ready = fd_isset_macro(server_socket , &rs);
if (socket_ready) {
/* Accept a new connection on the socket , create a
connection structure for it, and link it into the
head of the linked list of connections. */
accept_connection(server_socket , &head);
}
/* For each connection in the list pointed to by head ,
read from or write to its buffer of data. */
process_connections(head , &rs, &ws, last_msg_store);
}
Figure 5.Main loop of swap server (in C).
Themain body of the server is a non-terminating loop (Fig-
ure 5); in each iteration, it uses the select system call 1 to
check for pending connections to accept and for existing
connections ready for receiving/sending bytes from/to, and
processes them. A new connection is handled by initializing
a new connection structure and adding it into the list, and an
existing connection is processed by updating the read/write
buffers and advancing the connection’s state appropriately.
This buffering strategy lets the server interleave processing
of multiple connections without having to wait for one client
to send or receive a complete message.
Our C code is compiled by CompCert and should run on
any operating system with POSIX sockets. We have tested it
on CertiKOS, OSX, and Linux; our long-term aim is deeper
integration with CertiKOS’s own formal verification.
Verifying the C code To prove that the C implementa-
tion refines the implementation model (that is, that every
possible network behavior of the C program is allowed by
the implementation model), we use VST, a tool for prov-
ing correctness of C programs using separation logic. The
VST predicate ext_behavior C_prog impl_model in Figure 4
relates the operational semantics of the C program C_prog
to the interaction tree description given by impl_model. Sec-
tion 3 describes the implementation model in more detail.
VST’s model of program execution includes both con-
ventional program state (memory, local variables, etc.) and
external state, an abstract representation of the state of the
environment in which the program is running. We connect
the C program semantics to the implementation model by
adding a predicate ITree(t) to VST’s separation logic, assert-
ing that the environment expects the C program’s network
behavior to match the interaction tree t. Section 5 describes
this process.
Assumptions and modeling gaps We have a complete
proof (using VST) that the C implementation compiled with
CompCert network-refines the linear specification—that is,
1For simplicity, we choose select over epoll, a more efficient version
found in Linux.
a complete proof of the claim in Figure 4. This proof is
grounded in axiomatic specifications of the OS-level sys-
tem calls, and library functions like memset and the fdset
macros. We rely on the soundness of the Coq proof assistant,
plus the standard axioms of functional and propositional ex-
tensionality and proof irrelevance [Coq development team
2017].
For this case study, our verification bottoms out at the in-
terface between the application program and the operating
system; we rely on the correctness of the OS’s socket li-
brary and of the OS itself. Since we are running on CertiKOS,
the OS has actually been proved correct, but its correctness
proofs and ours are not formally connected. That is, our
specification of its socket API is axiomatized, but the axioms
are partially validated by connection to the corresponding
CertiKOS specifications (specifically, a VST specification of
recv has been partly connected to the CertiKOS-level one;
the other socket primitives remain to be connected). There
are several remaining challenges with connecting VST to
CertiKOS, ranging from the semantic—one critical technical-
ity is connecting VST’s step-indexed view of memory with
the flat memory model used by CertiKOS—to the technical—
they use different versions of Coq. See Section 7 for a fuller
description of what we have done to bridge these two formal-
izations. Also, because CertiKOS currently does not provide
a verified TCP implementation, the best it can do is mediate
between the VST axioms and some, possibly lower-level, ax-
iomatization of the untrusted TCP stack. Filling these gaps
is left to future work.
Testing network refinement For our long-term goal of
building verified systems software like web servers, rigorous
testing will be crucial, for two reasons. First, even small web
servers are fairly complex programs, and they take signifi-
cant effort to verify; streamlining this effort by catching as
many bugs as possible before spending much time on veri-
fication makes good economic sense, especially if the code
can be automatically tested against the very same specifica-
tion that will later be used in the verification effort. Second,
programs like web servers must often fit into an existing
ecosystem—a verified web server that interpreted the HTTP
RFCs (e.g., Belshe et al. [2015]) differently from Apache and
Nginx would not be used. Testing can be used to validate the
formal specification against existing implementations.
For the present case study, we use QuickChick [Lam-
propoulos and Pierce 2018], a Coq plugin for property-based
testing based on the popular QuickCheck tool [Claessen and
Hughes 2000]. We test both the compiled C code (by sending
it messages over a network interface) and the implementa-
tion model (by exploring its behaviors within Coq) against
the linear specification.
Supporting property-based testing requires executable
specifications of the properties involved. Happily, interaction
trees, which play a crucial role throughout our development,
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CoInductive itree (E : Type → Type) (R : Type) :=
| Ret (r : R)
| Vis {X : Type} (e : E X) (k : X → itree E R)
| Tau (t : itree E R).
Inductive event (E : Type → Type) : Type :=
| Event : ∀ X, E X → X → event E.
Definition trace E := list (event E)
Inductive is_trace E R
: itree E R → trace E → option R → Prop := ...
(* straightforward definition omitted *)
Figure 6. Interaction trees and their traces of events.
also work well with Coq-style program extraction, and hence
with testing. Testing must also be performed “modulo net-
work refinement” in the same way as verification. Section 6
describes this in more detail.
3 Interaction Trees
Components that interact with their environments appear
at many levels in our development (see Figure 1). We use
interaction trees (ITrees) as a general-purpose structure for
specifying such components. ITrees are a Coq adaptation
of similar concepts known variously as “freer,” “general,” or
“program” monads [Kiselyov and Ishii 2015; Letan et al. 2018;
McBride 2015]. We defer a deeper comparison until Section 8.
Constructing ITrees Figure 6 defines the type itree E R.
The definition is coinductive, so that it can represent poten-
tially infinite sequences of interactions, as well as divergent
behaviors. The parameter E is a type of external interactions—
it defines the interface by which a computation interacts
with its environment. R is the result of the computation: if
the computation halts, it returns a value of type R.
There are three ways to construct an ITree. The Ret r
constructor corresponds to the trivial computation that halts
and yields the value r. The Tau t constructor corresponds to
a silent step of computation, which does something internal
that does not produce any visible effect and then continues
as t. Representing silent steps explicitly with Tau allows us,
for example, to represent diverging computation without
violating Coq’s guardedness condition [Chlipala 2017]:
CoFixpoint spin {E R} : itree E R := Tau spin.
The final, and most interesting, way to build an ITree is
with the Vis X e k constructor. Here, e : E X is a “visible”
external effect (including any outputs provided by the com-
putation to its environment) and X is the type of data that
the environment provides in response to the event. The con-
structor also specifies a continuation, k, which produces the
rest of the computation given the response from the environ-
ment. Vis creates branches in the interaction tree because k
can behave differently for distinct values of type X.
Here is a small example that defines a type IO of out-
put or input interactions, each of which works with natural
numbers. It is then straightforward to define an ITree com-
putation that loops forever, echoing each input received to
the output:
Variant IO : Type → Type :=
| Input : IO nat
| Output : nat → IO ().
CoInductive echo : itree IO () :=
Vis Input (fun x⇒ Vis (Output x) (fun _⇒ echo)).
Working with ITrees Several properties of ITrees make
them appealing as a structure for representing interactive
computations. First, they are generic in the sense that, by
varying the E parameter, they can be instantiated to work
with different external interfaces. Moreover, such interfaces
can be built compositionally: for example, we can combine
a computation with external effects in E1 with a different
computation with effects in E2, yielding a computation with
effects in E1 + E2, the disjoint union of E1 and E2; there is a
natural inclusion of ITrees with interface E1 into ITrees with
interface E1 + E2. This approach is reminiscent of algebraic
effects [Plotkin and Power 2003]. Our development exploits
this flexibility to easily combine generic functionality, such
as a nondeterministic choice effect (which provides the or
operator used by the linear specification of Figure 3) with
domain-specific interactions such as the network send and
receive events. As with algebraic effects, we can write a han-
dler or interpreter for some or all of the external interactions
in an interface, for example to narrow the effects E1 + E2
down to just those in E1. Typically, such a handler will pro-
cess the events of E2 and “internalize” them by replacing
them with Tau steps.
Second, the type itree E is a monad [Moggi 1989; Wadler
1992], which makes it convenient to structure effectful com-
putations using the conventions and notations of functional
programming. We wrap the Ret constructor as a ret (return)
function and use the sequencing notation x ← e ;; k for the
monad’s bind. With a bit of wrapping and a loop combinator
forever, we can rewrite the echo example with less syntactic
clutter:
Definition echo : itree IO () :=
forever (x ← input ;; output x)
Third, the ITree definition works well with Coq’s extrac-
tion mechanism, allowing us to represent computations as
ITrees and run them for testing purposes. Here again, the
ability to provide a separate interpretation of events is useful,
since its meaning can be defined outside of Coq. In the echo
example, Output events could be linked to a console output
or to an OS’s network-send system call. ITrees thus provide
executable specifications.
One could, of course, simply consider such an extracted
implementation to be the final artifact (as in, for example,
Verdi [Wilcox et al. 2015]). However, we are interested in a
verified C implementation for two main reasons. First, ex-
tracting Coq to OCaml generally involves a certain amount
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r ← ei ;; k ⊑ r ← or e1 e2 ;; k i ∈ {1, 2}
k x ⊑ r ← choose l ;; k x ∈ l
r ← ret e ;; k ≡ k e
Tau k ≡ k
b ← (a ← e ;; f a);; g b ≡ a ← e ;; b ← f a ;; g b
Figure 7. Trace refinement and equivalence for ITrees.
of hackery—substituting native OCaml data structures for
less efficient Coq ones, interfacing with low-level operations
such as I/O system calls, etc.—and this process is entirely un-
verified. Moreover, the extracted code relies on OCaml’s run-
time and foreign-function interfaces, both of which would
have to be formalized to obtain the same strong guarantees
that we hope to achieve by connecting via C to CertiKOS. 2
Second, there is a potential performance gain from program-
ming directly in a low-level imperative language that may, in
the long run, be important for our eventual goal of verifying
a high-performance web-server.
Equivalence and Refinement Intuitively, ITrees that en-
code the same computation should be considered equivalent.
In particular, we want to equate ITrees that agree on their
terminal behavior (they return the same value) and on Vis
events; they may differ by inserting or removing any finite
number of Tau constructors. This “equivalence up to Tau” is a
form of weak bisimulation. We write t ≡ u when t and u are
equivalent up to Tau. The monad laws for ITrees also hold
modulo this notion of equivalence. (Some of the laws used
in our development are shown in Figure 7.)
ITrees that contain nondeterministic effects or that re-
ceive inputs from the environment denote a set of possible
traces—(finite prefixes of) execution sequences that record
each visible event together with the environment’s response.
The definitions of trace and the predicate is_trace, which
asserts that a trace belongs to an ITree, are shown in Fig-
ure 6. Subset inclusion of behaviors gives rise to a natural
notion of ITree refinement, written t ⊑ u, which says that
the traces of t are a subset of those allowed by u. We use this
refinement relation to allow an implementation to exhibit
fewer behaviors than those permitted by its specification.
Note that t ≡ u implies t ⊑ u.
ITrees as specifications: the linear specification Inter-
action trees provide a convenient yet rigorous way of for-
malizing specifications. We have already seen them in the
linear specification of the swap server in Figure 3. The itree
specE type there is an instance of itree whose visible events
include nondeterministic choice as well as observations of
swap request and response messages, which are events that
include message content and connection ID information. The
specification itself looks like a standard functional program
that uses an effect monad to capture network interactions.
2Compiling directly to native code using CertiCoq [Anand et al. 2017] would
alleviate at least some of these concerns.
Definition select_loop_body
(server_addr : endpoint_id)
(buffer_size : Z)
(server_st : list connection * string)
: itree implE (bool * (list connection * string)) :=
let '(conns , last_full_msg) := server_st in
or
(r ← accept_connection server_addr ;;
match r with
| Some c⇒ ret (true , (c::conns , last_full_msg))
| None ⇒ ret (true , (conns , last_full_msg)) end)
(let waiting_to_recv :=
filter (has_conn_state RECVING) conns in
let waiting_to_send :=
filter (has_conn_state SENDING) conns in
c ← choose (waiting_to_recv ++ waiting_to_send);;
new_st ← process_conn buffer_size c last_full_msg ;;
let '(c', last_full_msg ') := new_st in
let conns ' :=
replace_when
(fun x⇒ if (has_conn_state RECVING x
|| has_conn_state SENDING x)%bool
then (conn_id x = conn_id c' ?)
else false) c' conns in
ret (true , (conns ', last_full_msg '))).
Figure 8. Loop body of the implementation model.
ITrees as specifications: the implementation model
We use the same itree datatype, this time instantiated with
an event type implE which contains nondeterministic choice
and a networking interface (e.g., accept, send, recv), to define
the implementation model, which is a lower-level (but still
purely functional) specification of the swap server that more
closely resembles the C code. Figure 8 shows the body of the
main loop from the implementation model.
In contrast to the linear specification, the implementation
model maintains a list of connection structures instead of
bare connection identifiers. Each structure records the state
for some connection. The state indicates whether the server
should be SENDING or RECVING on the connection (or whether
the connection is closed). The state also records the contents
of send and receive buffers. In each iteration of the loop,
the server either accepts a new connection or services a
connection that is in the SENDING or RECVING state. Servicing
a connection in the SENDING state means sending some prefix
of the bytes in the send buffer; servicing a connection in the
RECVING state means receiving some bytes on the connection.
Note that the control flow of this model differs from both
the linear specification and the C implementation. The lin-
ear specification bundles together request–response pairs
and totally abstracts away from the details of buffering and
interleaving communications among multiple clients. The re-
lationship between the implementation model and the linear
specification is given by network refinement, as we explain in
the next section. For the C implementation, a single iteration
of the main server loop in Figure 5 corresponds to multiple
iterations of the select loop body of the model. Neverthe-
less, we can prove that the C behavior is a refinement of the
implementation model, as we describe in Section 5.
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Inductive network_event : Type :=
| NewConnection (c : connection_id)
| ToServer (c : connection_id) (b : byte)
| FromServer (c : connection_id) (b : byte).
Definition network_trace : Type := list network_event.
Figure 9. Types for events and traces observed over the
network. network_event maps to event values to form traces
for both the specification and the implementation model.
Definition server_transition (ev : network_event)
(ns ns ' : network_state) : Prop :=
match ev with
| FromServer c b⇒ let cs := Map.lookup ns c in
match connection_status cs with
| ACCEPTED ⇒ let cs ' := update_out
(connection_outbytes cs ++ [b]) cs
in ns ' = Map.update c cs ' ns
| PENDING | CLOSED⇒ False end
| ... (* Other two cases *) end.
Definition client_transition : network_event →
network_state → network_state → Prop := ...
Figure 10. Network transitions labeled by network_event,
showing only the case where the server sends a byte.
4 Network Refinement
We show a “network refinement” relation between the im-
plementation model and the linear specification. At a high
level, this property is a form of observational refinement [He
et al. 1986]: the behaviors of the implementation that can be
observed from across the network are included in those of
the specification. Intuitively, this property is also an analog,
in the network setting, of linearizability for concurrent data
structures; we compare them in detail in Section 8.
The network We model a simple subset of the TCP socket
interface, where connections carry bytestreams (the bytes
sent on an individual connection are ordered); they are bidi-
rectional (both ends can send bytes) and reliable (what is
received is a prefix of what was sent). This network model
is represented by a nondeterministic state machine where
each connection carries a pair of buffers of “in flight” bytes,
with labeled transitions for a client to open a connection,
a server to accept it, and either party to send and receive
bytes (Figures 9 and 10). For example, there is a transition
from network state ns to state ns', labeled FromServer c b,
if the connection cwas previously accepted by the server (its
status in ns is ACCEPTED) and the state ns' is obtained from
ns by adding byte b to the outgoing bytes on connection c.
We define a relation network_reordered_ ns ts tc :
Prop between server- and client-side traces of network events
ts and tc, which holds if they can be produced by an execu-
tion of the network starting from state ns. For the initial state
with all connections closed, we define network_reordered ts
tc = network_reordered_ initial_ns ts tc. The trace tc is
a “disordering” of ts—i.e., tc is one possible trace a client
Definition impl_behavior (impl : itree implE unit) :
network_trace → Prop :=
fun tr⇒ ∃ tr_impl , is_impl_trace impl tr_impl ∧
network_reordered tr_impl tr.
Definition spec_behavior (spec : itree specE unit) :
network_trace → Prop :=
fun tr⇒ ∃ tr_spec , is_spec_trace spec tr_spec ∧
network_reordered tr_spec tr.
Definition network_refines impl spec : Prop :=
∀ tr, impl_behavior impl tr → spec_behavior spec tr.
Figure 11. Definition of network refinement in Coq. The
functions is_impl_trace and is_spec_trace are thin wrap-
pers around is_trace that convert between traces of different
(but isomorphic) event types.
Record state := { get_ns : network_state;
get_spec : itree specE unit; ... }.
Definition nrefines_ (z : nat) (s : state)
(impl : itree implE unit) : Prop :=
∀ tr, is_impl_trace_ z s impl tr →
∃ dstr : network_trace ,
network_reordered_ (get_ns s) dstr tr ∧
is_spec_trace (get_spec s) dstr.
Figure 12. Refinement relation generalized for reasoning.
may observe if the server generated the trace ts. Conversely,
ts is a “reordering” of tc.
Network behavior of ITrees As mentioned in Section 3,
ITrees such as the implementation model (of type itree
implE) and the linear specification (itree specE) define sets
of event traces. From across the network, those events can
appear disordered to the client, so the network behavior of
an ITree is the set of possible disorderings of its traces (de-
fined using network_reorder). Finally, the ITree impl_model
network refines the linear_spec when the former’s network
behavior is included in the latter’s; see Figure 11.
Proving network refinement In order to prove that our
implementation model network refines the linear specifi-
cation, we establish logical proof rules for a generaliza-
tion of network_refines, named nrefines_ (Figure 12). The
nrefines_relation is step-indexed (z : nat) to handle the
server’s nonterminating loop; it relates a subtree of the im-
plementation model impl to a record s of the current state
of the network (get_ns s: network_state) and a subtree of
the specification ITree (get_spec s : itree specE unit).
Two example proof rules are shown in Figure 13. When
the server performs a network operation, for example when
it receives a byte on a connection c, we use a lemma such
as nrefines_recv_byte_: we must prove that the connection
c is open, and we then prove the nrefines_ relation on the
continuation k b, with an updated network state in s'.
At any point in the proof, we can also generate a part
of the reordered trace from the linear specification ITree
get_spec s, using the nrefines_network_transition_ lemma.
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Lemma nrefines_recv_byte_ z s
(c : connection_id) (k : byte → itree implE unit)
: In (get_status s c) [PENDING; ACCEPTED] →
(∀ b s', s' = append_inbytes c [b] s →
nrefines_ z s' (k b)) →
nrefines_ z s (b ← recv_byte c;; k b).
Lemma nrefines_network_transition_ z s spec ' ns' impl
(dtr : network_trace)
: (∀ dtr ', is_spec_trace spec ' dtr ' →
is_spec_trace (get_spec s)
(dtr ++ dtr ')) →
server_transitions dtr (get_ns s) ns' →
nrefines_ z (set_ns ns ' (set_spec spec ' s)) impl →
nrefines_ z s impl.
Figure 13. Example proof rules for nrefines_.
We actually use this rule at exactly two “linearization points”
in the implementation model: right after the server accepts
a new connection, and after it receives a complete message
from a client and swaps it with the last stored message.
Using these rules, we prove the proposition ∀ z,
nrefines_z s0 impl_model, where s0 is defined so that
get_spec s0 =linear_spec and get_ns s0 is the initial net-
work state, where all connections are closed; we can show
this implies the second clause of the correctness theorem
(Figure 4).
5 Verification
Embedding ITrees in VST VST is a framework for prov-
ing separation logic specifications of C programs, based on
the C semantics of the CompCert compiler. Its separation
logic comes with a proof automation system, Floyd, that
supplies tactics for symbolically executing a program while
maintaining its pre- and postcondition [Cao et al. 2018]. To
support reasoning about external behavior in general—and
the swap server’s invocations of OS/network primitives in
particular—we extend VST’s logic with two abstract predi-
cates [Penninckx et al. 2015]; these are separation logic pred-
icates that behave like resources but do not have a footprint
in concrete memory. Instead they connect to VST’s model
of external state, which in this case represents the allowed
network behavior of the program. To make this possible, we
made a small modification to the internals of VST to enable
it to refer to the external state in assertions.
The first abstract predicate, ITree(t), injects an interac-
tion tree t into a VST assertion (an mpred):
Definition ITree {R} (t : itree implE R) : mpred :=
EX t' : itree implE R, !!(t ⊑ t') && has_ext t'.
ITree t asserts that the observation traces of t (i.e., the traces
that may be produced by a program satisfying the assertion
ITree t) are included in the traces that are permitted by the
external environment (here, the OS). The has_ext predicate
asserts that the external state (here representing the network
behavior the OS expects from the program) is exactly t'. The
notation !!p lifts an ordinary Coq predicate p to a VST sepa-
ration logic predicate, and && and EX are logical conjunction
{ SOCKAPI st * ITree t *
data_at_ alloc_len buf_ptr *
!! ((r ← recv client_conn (Z.to_nat alloc_len) ;; k r)
⊑ t) *
!! (consistent_world st ∧ lookup_socket st fd =
ConnectedSocket client_conn) *
!! (0 ≤ alloc_len ≤ SIZE_MAX) }
ret = recv(int fd, void* buf_ptr , unsigned int
alloc_len , int flags)
{ ∃ (result : unit + option string) st ' ret contents ,
!! (0 ≤ ret ≤ alloc_len ∨ ret = - 1) *
!! (ret > 0 → (∃ msg , result = inr (Some msg) ∧ ...) ∧
st ' = st) *
!! (ret = 0 → result = inr None ∧ ...) *
!! (ret < 0 → result = inl tt ∧ ...) *
!! (Zlength contents = alloc_len) *
!! (consistent_world st ') *
SOCKAPI st ' *
ITree (match result with
| inl tt⇒ t
| inr msg⇒ k msg end) *
data_at alloc_len contents buf_ptr}
Figure 14. VST axiom for the recv system call.
and existential quantification at the level of separation logic
assertions.
While a detailed description of VST’s support for external
state is beyond the scope of the present paper and will be
reported elsewhere, we give some key properties of this
embedding. Internal code execution does not depend on
or alter external state, so every program step that is not a
call to the socket API leaves the ITree predicate unchanged.
The monad and equivalence laws from the abstract theory
of interaction trees are reflected as (provable) entailments
between ITree predicates (recall the refinement relation of
Figure 7):
t ⊑ u
ITree u ⊢ ITree t
This rule is contravariant because we can conform to the
ITree u by producing some subset of its allowed behavior.
External calls to network and OS functions are equipped
with specifications that reflect the evolution of interaction
trees, in resource-consuming fashion: actions are “peeled off”
from the ITree as execution proceeds, so that the interaction
tree in the postcondition of an external function specification
is a subtree of the tree in the precondition. The ITree found
in the outermost precondition of a program is thus a sound
approximation of all the program’s external interactions.
Hoare-logic specifications of system calls This use of
the ITree predicate can be seen in the VST axiom for the
recv system call in Figure 14. The precondition of this rule
requires that the ITree (r ← recv client_conn (...);; k
r), which starts with a recv event, be among the allowed
behaviors of t, so a legal implementation of this specification
is allowed to perform a recv call next. The postcondition
either leaves the interaction tree t untouched, in the case
that the call to recv failed, or says that the implementation
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may continue as k msg, in the case that the call to recv
successfully returned a message msg.
Most of the remaining constraints relate the program vari-
ables and the variables in the interaction tree to the cor-
responding state in memory. For example, the predicate
data_at_ alloc_len buf_ptr says that buf_ptr points to a
buffer of length alloc_len. The constraint lookup_socket
st fd = ConnectedSocket client_conn says that the socket
with identifier fd is in the connected state according to
the API and is associated with the connection identifier
client_conn appearing in the interaction tree.
This socket information is tracked by a second abstract
predicate, SOCKAPI(st), which asserts that the external socket
API memory can be abstracted as st, mapping file descrip-
tors to socket states closed, opened, bound, listening, or
connected. Bound and listening states are associated with
an endpoint identifier in the network model, and connected
states are associated with a connection identifier in the net-
work model. The reason for modularly separating socket
states from interaction trees is that the latter describe truly
external behavior while the former concern the (private)
contract between the server program and the OS. Specif-
ically, the functions for creating sockets, binding them to
addresses, and closing sockets (after shutdown) are not visi-
ble at the other end of the network and are hence specified
to only operate over SOCKAPI abstract predicates. In general,
system calls like recv that affect the network state carry
specifications of the form
{ SOCKAPI(st) * ITree (x ← op(a1, . . .); k x) * . . . }
op(a1, ...)
{ EX st ' t'. SOCKAPI(st ') * ITree(t') * . . . ∧
(ϕ(r) → t' = k r) ∧ (¬ϕ(r) → t' = t)}
where ϕ is a boolean predicate distinguishing ITree-
advancing (successful) invocations from failed invocations
(which leave the ITree unmodified), by inspection of the
implicitly quantified return value r.
Verifying the C implementation Having defined the ab-
stract predicates we need to describe the network behavior
of the server, we can now prove that the C implementa-
tion refines the implementation model using VST’s sepa-
ration logic. The goal is to prove that the implementation
model impl_model is an envelope around the possible network
behaviors of the C program, i.e., every execution of the C
program performs only the socket operations described in
impl_model; this is expressed by the predicate ext_behavior
C_prog impl_model. This proof then composes with the net-
work refinement proof between impl_model and the linear
specification to give us the main theorem in Figure 4.
We prove ext_behavior C_prog impl_model by specifying
and proving a Hoare triple for each function in the C imple-
mentation. We begin with axiomatized Hoare triples for the
library functions, in particular those from the POSIX socket
API; these triples modify the SOCKAPI state and possibly con-
sume operations from the ITree, as described above.
We then specify Hoare triples for functions in the program,
including embedded interaction trees where appropriate.
Verification proceeds as in standard Hoare logic, including
formulating an appropriate invariant for each loop. The most
interesting invariant is for the main loop, shown in Figure 5;
among other things, the invariant states that head points
to a linked list l of connection structures, last_msg_store
points to a buffer storing a message m, and the interaction
tree under ITree is an infinite loop of select_loop_body (Fig-
ure 8)) started on (l, m); the server address and buffer size
are constants.
Note that it is not immediate that the C loop body refines
select_loop_body. The former iterates over all ready con-
nections in process_connections, while the latter works
on only one connection per iteration. However, each it-
eration in process_connections is itself an iteration of
select_loop_body, so the inner invariant carries the same
interaction tree. Conceptually, one iteration of the main loop
in C corresponds to multiple iterations of the model.
6 Testing
Our overall approach to verifying software includes testing
for errors in code and specifications before we invest too
much effort in verification. For the swap server, we used
QuickChick [Lampropoulos and Pierce 2018], a property-
based testing tool in Coq, to test both whether the C imple-
mentation satisfies the linear specification, and whether the
implementation model refines the linear specification. These
tests help establish confidence in all three artifacts.
Test setup Our testbed consists of a simple hand-written
client, the server to be tested, and the linear specification
that the server should satisfy. The client opens multiple TCP
connections to simulatemultiple clients communicatingwith
the server over the network.
The testing process is straightforward: First, the client
generates a random sequence of messages along randomly
chosen TCP connections. The client then collects a trace of
its interactions with the server—the messages that it sent
and the responses that it received in return on each connec-
tion. Finally, the checker attempts to “explain” this trace by
enumerating all the possible reorderings of this trace and
checking whether any of them is, in fact, a trace of the linear
specification. If such a trace is found, this test case passes,
and another trace is generated. If none of the reorderings
satisfies the specification, the tester reports that it has found
a counterexample. Before actually displaying the counterex-
ample, the tester attempts to shrink it using a greedy search
process modeled on the one used in Haskell’s QuickCheck
tool, successively throwing away bits of the counterexample
and rechecking to see whether the remainder still fails.
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We can also test that the implementation model refines
the linear specification. The setup here is similar to the one
for the C program, but simpler because we can execute both
the client and server within a single Coq program rather
than extracting a client from Coq and running it with the
server and a network.
Testing the tester Although we did not find any bugs, we
assessed the effectiveness of testing using QuickChick’s mu-
tation testing mode [DeMillo et al. 1978] to inject 12 different
“plausible bugs” (of the sort commonly found in C: pointer
errors, bad initialization, off-by-one errors, etc.) into the code
and check that each could be detected during testing. The
bugs are added to the C program as comments marking a
section of “good code” and a “mutant” that can be substituted
for it. QuickChick performs this substitution for each of the
mutants in turn, generates random tests as usual, and reports
how many tests it took to find a counterexample for each of
the mutants.
We analyzed the running time and number of tests needed
to capture the bugs, by repeating QuickChick for 29 times on
each mutant. For five of the 12 mutants, the wrong behavior
was caught by the very first test in each run. Six of the mu-
tants passed the first test in some runs, but always failed by
the second test. The most interesting mutant was changing
the return value of the recv call. 3/4 of the runs caught the
bug within four rounds, but others took up to nine rounds.
This mutant sometimes causes the server not to respond,
which is trivially correct because our specification does not
deal with liveness. As a result, the tester discarded up to three
thousand test cases where the server did not respond, and
ran for up to five minutes before failing. The other mutants
could fail within 0.4 second with 95% confidence.
It is hard to draw definite conclusions about the effective-
ness of testing from a case study of this size, but the fact
that we are able to detect a dozen different bugs, most quite
quickly, is an encouraging sign that this approach to testing
will provide significant value as the codebase and its speci-
fication become more complex. Reports in the literature of
property-based random testing of similar kinds of systems
(e.g., Dropbox [Hughes et al. 2016]) are also encouraging.
7 Connecting to CertiKOS
A key pillar of the proof of correctness of the C implemen-
tation is the specification of the socket operations such as
send and recv. We took these specifications as axioms when
proving the implementation model, but because we are run-
ning the server on top of CertiKOS, which has its own formal
specification, we should be able to go one step better: we
would like to prove that the socket operations as specified
by CertiKOS satisfy the axioms used in the VST proof. This
part of the case study is still in progress; we report here on
what we’ve achieved so far and identify the challenges that
remain.
The Socket API in CertiKOS CertiKOS provides its own
axiomatized specifications for the POSIX socket API. Unlike
VST specifications, which are expressed as Hoare triples,
CertiKOS specifications are written as state transition func-
tions on the OS abstract state. This state is a record with a
field for each piece of real or ghost state that the OS main-
tains. This includes, for example, buffers for received network
messages, or socket statuses. To provide a common language
with VST for expressing allowable network communications,
we have modified CertiKOS’ state to also include an ITree
for each user process.
A function like recv presents a challenge in that it de-
pends on nondeterministic behavior by the network, but the
specification must be a deterministic function. The standard
solution used in CertiKOS is to parametrize the specification
by an “environment context” [Gu et al. 2018], which acts as
a deterministic oracle that takes a log of events and returns
the next step taken by the environment. Because the only
restriction on the environment context is that it is “valid”
(e.g., for networks this could mean that receive events always
have a corresponding earlier send event), properties proved
about the specifications hold regardless of the particular
choice of oracle. Equipped with such a network oracle, the
specification of recv is fairly straightforward (Figure 15).
Bridging VST and CertiKOS memories The other major
gap between VST and CertiKOS is their treatment of mem-
ory. Both VST and CertiKOS build on CompCert’s memory
model to describe the state of memory, but the changes they
make to it are unrelated and incompatible. VST builds a step-
indexed model on top of CompCert memories [Appel 2014],
to allow for “predicates in the heap”-based features, includ-
ing recursive predicates and lock invariants. Hoare triples
are interpreted as assertions on these step-indexed memo-
ries. On the other hand, the CompCert model corresponds to
virtual memory, and treats independent memory allocations
as belonging to separate, nonoverlapping “blocks”, while
CertiKOS uses a “flat” memory model in which there is only
one block to more accurately represent the kernel’s view of
physical memory. To bridge this gap, we need to translate
VST pre- and postconditions into assertions on ordinary,
step-index-free CompCert memories (and vice versa), and
transform predicates on multiple-block CompCert memories
into predicates on CertiKOS’s flat memories (and vice versa).
Performing this translation in general is an interesting re-
search problem, but for this application, the specifications to
be connected have a very particular form. The pre- and post-
conditions send and recv functions are each divided into
two parts: a memory assertion on a single buffer, an array
of bytes meant to hold the message, and an ITree assertion
describing the external network behavior. This simplifies the
task of connecting the VST and CertiKOS specs: we just need
to relate the interaction tree to some component of the OS
state, and translate an assertion on a single piece of memory
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Definition recv_spec (fd maxlen : Z) (d : OSData)
: option (OSData * Z) :=
let pid := d.(curid) in
(* Check that the ITree allows this behavior *)
match ZMap.get pid d.( itrees) with
| Vis (recv fd ' maxlen ') k⇒
if (fd = fd ' && maxlen = maxlen ') then
(* Query the oracle for the next network message *)
match net_oracle (ZMap.get pid d.(net)) with
| RECV msg⇒
(* Take up to maxlen bytes *)
let msg ' := prefix maxlen msg in
let len := length msg '⇒
(* Update the ITree based on len *)
let res := if (len > 0) then inr (Some msg ')
else if (len = 0) then inr None
else inl tt in
let itree ' := match res with
| inl tt⇒ ZMap.get pid d.( itrees)
| inr msg⇒ k msg end in
(* Update the OS state and return len *)
Some (d {itrees: ZMap.set pid itree ' d.( itrees)}
{rbuf: ZMap.set pid msg ' d.(rbuf)}
{net: RECV msg :: d.(net)}, len)
| _⇒ None end
else None
| _⇒ None end.
Definition sys_recv_spec (d: OSData) : option OSData :=
(* Get the arguments from registers *)
fd ← uctx_arg2_spec d ;;
buf_vaddr ← uctx_arg3_spec d ;;
len ← uctx_arg4_spec d ;;
(d1 , recv_len) ← recv_spec fd len d ;;
(* Copy the contents of the kernel buffer to the
user address *)
d2 ← flatmem_copy_from_rbuf len buf_vaddr d1 ;;
(* Set the return value *)
d3 ← uctx_set_retval1_spec recv_len d2 ;;
uctx_set_errno_spec E_SUCC d3.
Figure 15. CertiKOS specification of recv.
into the flat memory model and back. (The other socket op-
erations do not involve any changes to user memory, though
they do modify kernel memory, which is abstracted to the C
program via the SOCKAPI predicate.)
We have explored this approach by sketching the corre-
spondence between the VST specification of recv and its
CertiKOS specification. We translated the VST pre- and post-
condition for recv into step-index-free predicates on Comp-
Cert memories and interaction trees by hand, and proved
the correctness of the translation using the underlying logic
of VST. We then wrote functions that transfer a single block
of memory between the CompCert model and the flat model,
and adapted the CertiKOS OS component representing the
network state to use interaction trees, so that the two systems
have a common language to describe network operations.
The network component of the CertiKOS OS state is now
a map that, for each user process, holds an interaction tree
describing the network communication that that process is
allowed to perform. Finally, we are in the process of prov-
ing that the CertiKOS specification for recv satisfies the
step-index-free, flattened versions of the VST pre- and post-
condition. This gives us a path to validating the axiomatized
specifications of the socket API that we rely on for the cor-
rectness of the C implementation: they can be substantiated
by connection to the (axiomatized) behavior of the socket
operations in the underlying operating system.
8 Related Work
Interaction trees As mentioned in Section 3, our “inter-
action trees” are a Coq-compatible variation of ideas found
elsewhere. Kiselyov and Ishii [2015] present a similar con-
cept under the name “freer monad”. It is proposed as an
improvement over a “free monad” type, which one might
hope to define in Coq as follows:
Inductive free (E : Type → Type) (R : Type) :=
| Ret : R → free E R
| Vis : E (free E R) → free E R. (* NOT PERMITTED!! *)
Unfortunately, the recursive occurrence of free in the Vis
constructor is not strictly positive, so this definition will
be rejected by Coq. Thus in a total language, the choice
for the Vis constructor to separate the effect E X from the
continuation X → itree E R is largely driven by necessity,
whereas the work on freer monads proposes it as a matter
of convenience and performance.
The McBride [2015] variant, which builds on earlier work
by Hancock [2000], is called the “general monad.” It is defined
inductively, and its effects interface replaces our single E
: Type → Type parameter with S : Type and a type family
S → Type to calculate the result type. It was introduced as
a way to implement general recursive programs in a total
language (Agda), by representing recursive calls as effects
(i.e., Vis nodes). Our coinductively defined interaction trees
also support a general (monadic) fixpoint combinator.
Letan et al. [2018] present the “program monad” to model
components of complex computing systems. Like the general
monad, it is defined inductively. Whereas our interpretation
of ITrees is based on traces, they use a coinductively defined
notion of “operational semantics” to provide the context in
which to interpret programs, describing the state transitions
and results associated with method calls/effects.
Our choice to use coinduction and the Tau constructor
gives us a way to account for “silent” (internal) computa-
tion steps, and hence allows us to semantically distinguish
terminating from silently-diverging computations (which
is not easy with trace-based semantics, at least not with-
out adding a “diverges” terminal component to some of the
traces). Although liveness is explicitly not part of our cor-
rectness specification in this project (the spec is conditioned
on there being visible output), it is conceivable to strengthen
the specifications and account for Tau transitions as part of
the C semantics, which might allow one to prove liveness
properties (although VST does not currently support that).
However, there are also costs to working with coinduction:
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our top-level programs are defined by CoFixpoint, and coin-
duction is generally not as easy to use in Coq as it could
be [Chlipala 2017; Hur et al. 2013].
Verifying effectful systems A common approach to rea-
soning about effectful programs is to provide a model of
the state of the outside world, with access mediated strictly
through external functions. These functions may be given
(possibly non-deterministic) semantics directly [Chlipala
2015], or indirectly through an oracle [Férée et al. 2018;
Gu et al. 2015]. For example, in Férée et al. [2018], exter-
nal functions are called through a Foreign Function Interface
(FFI), and specification/verification is done with respect to
an instantiated FFI oracle that records external calls and
defines the state of the environment and the semantics of
external functions. In their work, a TextIO library was veri-
fied with respect to a model of the file system. Similarly, our
specifications in terms of Hoare triples assume a model of
external socket API memory, i.e., the state under the SOCKAPI
predicate, and describe how this state is transformed.
Stronger specifications of effectful programs can involve
dynamics (“what has happened” ) rather than statics (“what is
the final state” ). In such cases, a model of the external state is
commonly extended with (or taken to be) a trace or history of
past events, and specifications involve these traces. Chajed
et al. [2018]; Hawblitzel et al. [2015]; Leroy [2009]; Malecha
et al. [2011], etc. use this approach.
Our specifications are based on interaction trees (which
can be construed as sets of traces), with one major difference:
interaction trees specify “what is allowed to happen”. Rather
than reasoning about lists of events that have occurred in the
past, our reasoning is based on the trees of events that are
allowed to be produced in the future. One main advantage
of using interaction trees is that it gives us a unifying struc-
ture for specification, testing, and verification, as detailed
in Section 3. A similar underlying structure to interaction
trees is used as specifications of distributed systems in an
early version of F* [Swamy et al. 2011], but that work did not
show how to use the structure for testing or how to do refine-
ment. Gu et al. [2018] use environment contexts to specify
past events as well as future events, but rather than starting
with all possible traces and consuming them, valid traces
are generated one event at a time by consulting an oracle.
Although using this step-based approach instead of explicitly
coinductive ITrees leads to different specification styles, it is
possible to connect them as we discussed in Section 7.
Linearizability Network refinement is closely related to
linearizability [Herlihy and Wing 1990], a correctness crite-
rion for concurrent data structures. A data structure imple-
mentation is linearizable if, for every possible collection of
client threads, the behavior of the data structure is indistin-
guishable from the behavior of a sequential implementation
of the structure. Filipovic et al. [2009] related linearizability
to contextual refinement. Network refinement is essentially
this same idea of contextual refinement, but with network
effects playing the role of relaxed memory. Our network
model closely resembles TSO, and network refinement is
similar to TSO-linearizability [Burckhardt et al. 2012].
Verifying networked servers In one early attempt at
server verification, Black [1998] verified security properties
of the thttpdweb server, based on axiomatized C semantics.
That work did not establish the functional correctness of the
web server, the axiomatic semantics was not testable, and it
did not consider the effects of network reordering.
IronFleet [Hawblitzel et al. 2015] is a methodology for ver-
ifying distributed system implementations and it is similar
to our approach in several ways: both verify the functional
correctness of a networked system; both use a “one client at a
time” style specification at the top-level; and both verify the
correctness of a system implementation which interleaves
its operations via linearizability. However, there are several
major differences between IronFleet and our work: (1)We are
concernedwith testing, as it allows us to find implementation
bugs early, and it also allows us to use the same specification
for blackbox-testing of existing implementations. For these
reasons, we choose the executable interaction trees to repre-
sent the specification. IronFleet focuses instead on reducing
the burden of verification. It uses non-executable state ma-
chines, and it relies on tool support such as near-real-time
IDE-integrated feedback for rapid verification. (2) Our work
verifies C implementations. VST and CompCert ensure that
the properties we have proved at the source-code level are
preserved after the program has been compiled to assembly
code. IronFleet verifies programs written in Dafny [Leino
2010], and extracts them to C#. This means that both the
extraction engine and the .NET compiler must be trusted.
The authors of IronFleet also suggest an alternative strategy
to reduce the trusted computing base, by first translating the
programs to assembly code, and verifying the assembly code
using an automatically translated specification [Hawblitzel
et al. 2014]. However, that still requires the specification
translator to be trusted. (3) IronFleet is based on UDP, while
our works is based on TCP. Nevertheless, we both need to
consider packet reordering. The difference is that messages
will not be reordered on each individual connection. (4) Iron-
Fleet uses TLA+ [Lamport 2002] to prove liveness properties.
The partial-correctness approach of separation logic makes
it more difficult to reason about liveness.
CSPEC [Chajed et al. 2018] is a framework for verifying
concurrent software. CSPEC focuses on reducing the num-
ber of interleavings a verifier must consider. To do that, it
provides a general verification framework built on mover
types [Lipton 1975]. We may be able to use mover types to
simplify the process of proving network refinement.
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Verdi [Wilcox et al. 2015] is a framework for verified dis-
tributed systems that work under different fault and net-
work models. Verified System Transformers transform a dis-
tributed system verified under one model to one that works
in another. In particular, the Raft system transformer [Woos
et al. 2016] transforms a given state machine (server) into a
distributed system of servers that synchronize state using
Raft messages, over a network that may drop, reorder, or
duplicate messages. Any trace of Raft I/O messages produced
by the distributed system can then be linearized to an I/O
trace of the input state machine. Distributed systems and
transformers are written in Coq and extracted to OCaml.
Ridge [2009] verified the functional correctness and lin-
earizability of a networked, persistentmessage queuewritten
in OCaml using the HOL4 theorem prover. In contrast to
Verdi and Ridge’s work, our methodology focuses on test-
ing and verifying C implementations, dealing with the full
complexity of low-level programming including memory
allocation and pointer aliasing.
For simplicity, our work builds on a small subset of axiom-
atized TCP specifications. A rigorous and experimentally-
validated specification of TCP can be found in Bishop et al.
[2005a,b] and Ridge et al. [2009].
Testing There is more research on testing linearizability
of concurrent or distributed systems than we can summarize
here, including Burckhardt et al. [2010]; Scott et al. [2016];
Shacham et al. [2011]; Vechev et al. [2009]. Our work is dis-
tinguished by its focus on uniting testing and verification in
the same framework. QuickCheck’s property-based testing
methodology has been shown to be useful in formal verifica-
tion [Bulwahn 2012; Lampropoulos and Pierce 2018]. There
are also many accounts of successfully applying property-
based random testing to real-world systems. For example,
Hughes and Bolinder [2011] used QuickCheck to test for
race conditions in dets, a vital component of the Mnesia dis-
tributed database system; Arts et al. [2015] have applied the
methodology to test the AUTOSAR Basic Software for Volvo
Cars, and Hughes et al. [2016] have tested the linearizability
of Dropbox, the distributed synchronization service.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
Starting from a C implementation and a “one client at a
time” specification of swap server behavior, we have proved
that every execution of the implementation correctly follows
the specification. The proof breaks down into layers of re-
finements: from the C program to an implementation-level
interaction tree, and from there, via network refinement to
the linear interaction tree. We use VST to verify the C code,
pure Coq to relate the trees, QuickChick to test our specifi-
cations and implementations, and CertiKOS to validate our
specifications of network communication. The result is a
proof of the correctness of the swap server from the linear
specification down to the interface between the C program
and the operating system.
Although this work represents significant progress toward
the Deep Specification project’s goal of formally-verified sys-
tems software, much remains to be done. The verification
of the swap server has tested the limits of VST, in terms of
both scale and style of specifications. Previous VST verifi-
cations were self-contained libraries, but this swap server
interacts with the OS through the socket API, requiring us
to develop new features (the external assertions) that should
be useful for verifying a variety of more realistic programs.
The scale of this project forced us to debug and streamline
VST’s existing automation.
A clear next step is to fully verify the socket API used by
the server, by completing the proof that each VST socket
axiom follows from the specification of the corresponding
operation in CertiKOS. Doing so will require several more
proofs along the lines of our verification of recv, bridging
the gap between VST’s step-indexedmemory and CertiKOS’s
flat memory, as well as defining a suitable C-level abstraction
of the kernel memory related to the socket operations. This
will further extend the reach of our result, so that we rely
only on the correctness of the operating system’s model of
the socket API.
Many real-world web servers are multi-threaded, handling
requests from different clients in separate threads. Some
parts of our approach are already able to handle concurrency:
the top-level specification ITree should be sequential regard-
less of the implementation, and VST and CertiKOS already
support concurrent C programs [Gu et al. 2018; Mansky et al.
2017]. Other parts will require adjustment: for instance, the
implementation model may need to explicitly represent the
concurrency allowed in the C program.
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